It is shown how many techniques of categorical domain theory can be expressed in the general context of topical categories (where \topical" means internal in the category Top of Grothendieck toposes with geometric morphisms). The underlying topos machinery is hidden by using a geometric form of constructive mathematics, which enables toposes as \generalized topological spaces" to be treated in a transparently spatial way, and also shows the constructivity of the arguments. The theory of strongly algebraic (SFP) domains is given as a case study in which the topical category is Cartesian closed.
1. Introduction 1.1. \Topology-free spaces" \Always topologize!" (Stone 1938) \A topos is a generalized topological space." (Grothendieck 1972) Taken together, these two dicta imply a general mathematical programme of topologization in which classes are replaced by toposes: instead of the class of widgets we consider the topos classifying widgets (i.e. the topos whose points are widgets). The topos not only determines the class of widgets, but simultaneously, and inseparably, embodies the generalized topological structure on the generalized space of widgets.
This resort to toposes may seem at rst sight an unacceptably burdensome technical overhead, but in fact the practical mathematical consequences can be surprisingly unobtrusive. Toposes classify theories in the so-called \geometric" logic, and it is quite in order to treat a topos as a \space" whose points are the models of the theory and to treat a geometric morphism (a generalized continuous map between generalized topological spaces) as a transformation of points of one such space into points of another. As long as the transformation is de ned uniformly and in accordance with a geometrically constructive discipline it will yield a geometric morphism, and so we see continuity under a new light as uniformity combined with geometricity. Our Stone-Grothendieck generalized topologization is thus achieved by working with a geometric \Stone-Grothendieck mathematics". Since this often has the e ect of avoiding explicit discussion of topological structure (lattices of opens or categories of sheaves), we shall refer to this view of toposes as one of \topology-free spaces" { which is not to say that these generalized spaces do not Steven Vickers 2 have any topology, but rather that it is intrinsic and hidden. Introductory accounts of the ideas are in Vickers ( , 1998a ; more technical justi cation is in Vickers (1997a) .
To explain how this works, we rst have to be very clear about the dual nature of toposes: as Mac Lane and Moerdijk (1992) say right at the outset, a topos can be considered both as a \generalized topological space" and as a \generalized universe of sets". But the formal de nitions say that the topos is the generalized universe of sets, and in these terms it is extremely di cult to sustain the generalized space view. Hence although this view is a fundamental one of which experienced topos theorists are fully aware, it tends to get obscured in the exposition.
We shall explicitly separate the two viewpoints by reserving the word topos for the generalized spaces. (This runs counter to the general usage, but has etymological support in that it treats toposes as the objects of which topology is the study.) The generalized universes of sets { speci cally, those categories (otherwise known as Grothendieck toposes) that satisfy the conditions of Giraud's theorem (see Johnstone (1977) ) { will be called geometric universes or GUs (in Vickers (1993a Vickers ( , 1995a Vickers ( , 1995b they are called Giraud frames or G-frames). The distinction is analogous to that between locales and frames (in Johnstone (1982) ; or, in Joyal and Tierney (1984) , the distinction between spaces and locales), and indeed we hope that the techniques of spatial reasoning for locales that are investigated in Vickers (1995) can be developed for toposes too. Similarly, a GU homomorphism will be a functor that preserves nite limits and arbitrary colimits { hence, the inverse image part of a geometric morphism. For a topos D, the corresponding geometric universe will be written SD.
The present paper is in large measure a case study for this topologization programme in which it is applied to domain theory, and one deliberate aim is to give a topos-theoretic account that looks as much as possible just like constructive domain theory. A preliminary account in the form of lecture slides has already appeared (Vickers 1992a) .
Let us now lay down the ground rules for this geometric mathematics (technical justication is in Vickers (1997a) ).
(1) \Geometric" mathematics comprises those constructions and properties that can be interpreted in any geometric universe and are preserved by GU homomorphisms.
(2) If certain structures are described as being the models of a geometric theory T, that is to say, they are speci ed by structure and properties within geometric mathematics, then there is a corresponding \classifying" topos T] of which those structures are the points.
Recall the usual notion of a geometric theory presentation { a many-sorted, in nitary, rst-order theory presentation, in which the axioms take the form `x . Here x is a nite list of sorted variables and and are geometric formulae (the only connectives allowed are arbitrary disjunction, nitary conjunction, sorted equality and existential quanti cation) whose free variables are all taken from x. (Details can be found in Makkai and Reyes (1977) ; also in Johnstone (1977) and Mac Lane and Moerdijk (1992) , though for simplicity they treat the coherent theories, restricted to the nitary logic.) We shall be more liberal and admit presentations that use geometric constructions as Topical Categories of Domains 3 type constructors, to create new types out of the given sorts (the base types). Function and predicate symbols will be allowed to use the derived types in their arities.
(3) If such a theory in (2) is \essentially propositional", that is to say, it has no sorts (other than what can be constructed geometrically out of thin air), then the corresponding topos is actually a locale. We have no need to distinguish between locales and localic toposes, since our notation explicitly distinguishes between frames D and geometric universes SD. (4) Suppose D and E are two toposes. Then construction of points of E out of points of D, if it is geometric, describes a geometric morphism (or map) from D to E.
(5) Geometric morphisms between locales are the same as continuous maps.
Consequently, we describe a locale or a topos by giving a geometric description of its points; and we describe a continuous map or a geometric morphism by giving a geometric description of how it transforms points to points. No discussion of topology is then needed because the geometricity already covers that, and so locales and toposes appear as \topology-free spaces". Of course, this phrase is introduced in direct contrast with the common description of locales as \point-free topologies". The point-free topology is the frame of opens, treated as an algebraic structure in its own right. The \topology-free space" methods are to work rather with presentations by generators and relations, and then in a switch of emphasis to treat them not as algebraic presentations of the frames but as geometric descriptions of the points.
We shall examine what is allowed in this geometric mathematics, but rst let us mention some things that are not allowed.
| The logic is non-classical. Intuitionistic logic is valid in geometric universes, but in general excluded middle and choice are not valid. More subtly, intuitionistic negation is not preserved by GU homomorphisms, and nor are implication and universal quanti cation { so we can't use them in general, though we shall on occasion use the intuitionistic formulae in proving geometric results. The geometric logic is therefore more restricted than intuitionistic logic. However, if we can prove or postulate that two propositions P and Q are logical complements (P^Q`false, true`P _ Q), then that fact is preserved by GU homomorphisms and so gives an instance of a geometric negation.
| We can't use exponentials X Y , powersets PX, or the subobject classi er { none of these is preserved by GU homomorphisms. I shall not attempt to formalize the geometric constructions, but they include nite limits, set-indexed colimits, image factorization, monicness, epiness, inclusion between subobjects, nite intersections and arbitrary set-indexed unions of subobjects, existential quanti cation, free algebra constructions, N (natural numbers), Q (rationals), Kuratowski niteness, nite powersets (free semilattices) FX, universal quanti cation bounded over nite objects. A couple of speci c issues worth mentioning are decidability and niteness. Equality is part of the geometric logic, but inequality is not (because there is no negation). Nonetheless, certain \decidable" sets come equipped with inequality, a relation complementary to equality { two good examples are N and Q. Finiteness is { as remarked above { KuSteven Vickers 4 ratowski niteness (Johnstone 1977 ): X is Kuratowski nite i the free semilattice FX on X has an element T such that fxg T for every x in X. This notion can sometimes behave surprisingly. For instance, subsets of nite sets, or intersections of nite subsets, need not themselves be nite. Section 2.1 provides a technical discussion.
Notes { 1 If T is a geometric theory, then the corresponding geometric universe S T] is exactly the category that is usually referred to as the classifying topos of T. The notation can be read either as Sheaves over the topos T], or as Sets with an adjoined generic model of T. 2 When we refer to the points of T], the models of T, these models might be in an arbitrary geometric universe SD. D is known as the stage of de nition of the point, and the theory of classifying toposes shows that points of T] at stage D are the same as maps from D to T]. Models in the initial GU S = S1 of sets, i.e. maps from 1 to T], are known as global points. 3 If f and g are two maps from T] to T 0 ], then a natural transformation from f to g is a geometric construction, given a model M of T, of a homomorphism from f(M) to g(M).
4 Toposes, maps and natural transformations are the 0-, 1-and 2-cells of a 2-category Top. We shall look at it more closely later, but let us note immediately that the hom-categories Top( T]; T 0 ]) (which is equivalent to the category of models of T 0 in S T]) are not arbitrary categories { they have all ltered colimits (Johnstone 1977 ).
Topologizing domain theory
It has long been recognized that domains are topological spaces under their Scott topology. Normally, they are also sober (at least for continuous dcpos, though not, by Johnstone (1981) , for arbitrary ones) and hence can be equivalently treated as locales. This provides a technical basis for treating domains as, fundamentally, topological structures (speci cally, for us, locales) rather than ordered structures (e.g. dcpos). Since any locale has both an order (specialization) on points and all directed joins of points, we can nd a least xpoint for any endomap of any locale with bottom point (a local locale), thus giving us the essential domain theoretic machinery used to interpret recursion. Moreover, there is a conceptual basis for the primacy of topology in that the order is often understood as an \information" order, and the topology provides a direct account of that information { each open represents a nitely observable amount of it, as argued, for instance, in Vickers (1989) or Abramsky (1991) . Therefore, as an application of Stone's dictum, we shall take it as axiomatic that a domain is fundamentally a locale rather than a partially ordered set of any kind. This can sometimes seem a retrograde step. For instance, unlike the category of dcpos, the category of locales is not Cartesian closed { though this advantage for general dcpos is lost in the algebraic case and only recovered in strongly algebraic domains after substantial work. Nonetheless, the results of the paper will show that the topologization programme holds together and in fact gives a greater unity to the techniques of domain theory.
By the remarks of Section 1.1, domains as locales are also toposes. It turns out that Topical Categories of Domains 5 domain theoretic constructions such as products, coproducts and exponentials are special cases of the more general topos constructions, and we shall prove this. In particular, the existence of least xpoints for continuous endomaps of domains with bottom turns out to be a special case of the existence of initial xpoints for arbitrary endomaps of local toposes (toposes with initial points) { in e ect, local toposes are algebraically complete in the appropriately transferred sense of Freyd (1991) . However, the methods go considerably beyond this. Nice enough domains can be presented by information systems of various avours (e.g. Larsen and Winskel 1984; ; or indeed the slightly di erent methods of Abramsky 1991) that are the models of geometric theories, and moreover the continuous maps between the domains are equivalent to \approximable mappings" between information systems, which are also the models of geometric theories. Fixing a avour of information system, we therefore get two toposes IS] and AM]. (AM is the theory of two information systems and an approximable mapping between them.) We also have maps src and tar : AM] ! IS] giving the source and target, a map id : IS] ! AM] giving the identity approximable mappings, and more that in short make an internal category in Top { a topical category. (The fact that Top is a 2-category greatly complicates the idea of internal category in it, and a de nitive account of such things (Hyland and Moerdijk unpublished) hasn't appeared yet. However, the topical categories we study will all in a certain sense represent full subcategories of Top, in that the approximable mappings correspond to arbitrary maps (as geometric morphisms) between the corresponding domains (as toposes), and this gives us a somewhat more solid base on which to rest the internal category structure.) We nd that the topical category has, internally, much of the structure of the corresponding category of domains, and in particular for strongly algebraic domains the topical category is internally Cartesian closed. This is a stronger result than appears at rst sight, for with some other well-known CCCs such as Set, the Cartesian closedness is not internal in the corresponding topical category: essentially this is because exponentiation of sets is not geometric.
The topos setting now begins to pay o more decisively. In particular, we can use the result mentioned above on algebraic completeness of local toposes to nd not only xpoints within domains, but also xpoints among domains, i.e. solutions of domain equations. This is most easily seen for domains with bottom, when IS] is local (the singleton information system f?g is initial) and any map F : IS] ! IS], i.e. any uniform, geometric construction of information systems from information systems, has an initial algebra: this will solve the domain equation D = F(D). The key point is that toposes automatically have all the ltered colimits that abstract categorical domain theory has to postulate, and the uniform, geometric de nitions of geometric morphisms su ce to give us the required continuity, preservation of these ltered colimits.
Note that F is necessarily functorial, but that is with respect to the homomorphisms between information systems { 2-cells in Top { and not the approximable mappings.
In the strongly algebraic case, which is internally Cartesian closed, we have a map F(X) = X ) X] that is not functorial with respect to continuous maps. However, the homomorphisms turn out to correspond to adjunctions between the domains so that we painlessly discover the well-known technical trick from domain theory that regains Steven Vickers 6 functoriality. (Actually, domain theory normally uses embedding-projection pairs, not general adjunctions. The di erence corresponds to the constructivist issue of whether the information system order is decidable or not.)
1.3. Overview of the paper Following this introduction, we move in Section 2 to the technical background. Much of this is already known, though perhaps some of the detailed proofs have not been set out before. However, I do not know of convenient references and certainly not in the \generalized space" language that I am using.
In section 3 we look at some examples of topical categories, and in particular at two ways of constructing them. An \intrinsic" topical category captures the idea, given any topos D, of a category whose objects are points of D and whose morphisms are homomorphisms. These are simple, but inadequate for our domain theory. We need the slightly more complicated notion of \display" topical category. This starts from an exponentiable map p : E ! D, and captures the idea of a category whose objects are points of D, but whose morphisms are maps between pullbacks of p. It is relatively rare for these topical categories to be Cartesian closed, and we illustrate this with some counterexamples.
Section 4 treats the particular case of strongly algebraic domains, in which the topical category is Cartesian closed, in some detail. Its domain-theoretic substance is largely taken from Abramsky (1991) . Its purpose is not so much to present the results in a new way, di erent from Abramsky's { the apparent di erences are often ones of expositional taste rather than anything else { but to show how unobtrusive the new, topos-theoretic foundations are.
Section 5 addresses domain equations and their solution.
Section 6 discusses what is achieved by the topical methods, and speculates on revised foundations using Joyal's Arithmetic Universes. (Kock et al. 1975; Johnstone 1977) ) has some unexpected behaviour, a notorious example being that subsets of nite sets need not themselves be nite (Kock et al. 1975) . Nonetheless, it ts well with observational intuitions that a set is nite i you can give a nite list of all its elements. (But note that if equality is not decidable then you can't necessarily eliminate duplicates from the list.) Two nite sets are equal i every element of each is Topical Categories of Domains 7 also an element of the other. To understand the paradox of subsets, suppose S is nite and T = fs 2 S j (s)g. To list all the elements of T, we also need negative information : (s) in order to know which elements of S can be omitted from the list.
Technical background
We recap here some basic properties and constructions relating to nite sets, and in particular the fact that bounded universal quanti cation over a nite set is geometric (Johnstone and Linton 1978) . Much of this seems to be well-known folklore, but I don't know of any convenient reference for the ideas and shall summarize them here.
The rst step is to construct the nite power set FX over X, and this is done as the free (join) semilattice. As it happens, by a theorem of Mikkelson this can be constructed in any elementary topos as the -subsemilattice of PX generated by the singletons (see Theorem 9.16 in Johnstone 1977) . However, in the context of geometric universes it is perhaps more convenient to see the construction as a special case of the existence of free algebras for any single-sorted algebraic theory that is nitary enough (Theorem 6.43 in Johnstone 1977) . Moreover, by Lemma 6.44 there, the free algebra construction is preserved by GU homomorphisms: in other words, free algebra constructions are \geometric".
FX is the set of Kuratowski nite subsets of X. From now on we shall omit \Kura-towski": when we say nite, we mean Kuratowski nite.
We have already noted that subsets of nite sets need not be nite; here are some other unexpected behaviours.
| Finite unions of nite sets are undoubtedly nite (just concatenate the lists of elements), but nite intersections are not. For a start, the empty intersection of nite subsets of X is the whole of X, which certainly need not be nite. More subtly, if S and T are nite then S \T need not be because to discover what are all the elements of S \ T you must be able to determine the negative information of when x = 2 S (or T).
| The cardinality of a nite set is not de ned in general. To know that you have counted exactly how many elements there are in fw; x; y; zg, you need to know all the equalities and inequalities amongst the elements, and the negative information is not always available geometrically. (Often the problem is one of decidability, i.e. lack of negative information. For instance, if is decidable and S is nite then fu 2 S j (u)g is nite; and if X has decidable equality, a binary predicate 6 = that's a complement of =, then FX has binary intersections and there is a cardinality function from FX to N.) De nition 2.1.1. (Finitely bounded universal quanti cation) Let (x; Proof. Let M be the subset of FX comprising those elements S for which 8T : FX:( (T ) ! (S T)). M is a subsemilattice, and by the induction step it contains the singletons, so it is the whole of FX. From S 2 M, and the base case (;), we deduce (S). Note that although the statement of this Theorem is geometric, the proof is not { it uses intuitionistic formulae. We conjecture that there is a geometric proof.
(In Theorem 2.1.11 we shall prove a stronger induction principle.)
Lemma 2. 
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Then h(;) = g(;; y 0 ) = y 0 , and h(fxg S) = g(fxg S; y 0 ) = g(fxg; g(S; y 0 )) = f(x; h(S)). Uniqueness follows by F-induction.
Using F-induction, we can easily prove a number of results. Theorem 2.1.6. 1 8x 2 S:( (x) _ (x))`S :FX 9S ; S :(S = S S ^8x 2 S : (x)^8x 2 S : (x)) 2 Decidable subsets of nite sets are nite (Kock et al. 1975 ): if S is nite and (x) is decidable, then fx 2 S j (x)g is nite.
(Use 1 with the complement of .) 3 (Johnstone 1984) 8x 2 S:( (x) _ (x))`S :FX 8x 2 S: (x) _ 9x 2 S: (x) Note that the analogous deduction with S in nite is intuitionistically unsound, so this result is saying something about nite boundedness. It is directly analogous to the relation \ ( _ )` _ } " seen in the Vietoris powerlocale. 4 If is decidable, with complement , then 8x 2 S: (x) and 9x 2 S: (x) are complements.
5 If X has decidable equality, then on FX we have that 2 is decidable (x 0 = 2 S is equivalent to 8x 2 S:x 6 = x 0 ), that the intersection of two nite sets is still nite (use 2 with S \ T = fx 2 S j x 2 Tg; see Acuña-Ortega and Linton (1979) ) and that each nite set has a cardinality. 6 8x 2 S:9y : Y: (x; y)`S :FX 9U : F(X Y ):(fst(U) = S^U ) 7 Emptiness is a decidable property in FX: the formula S = ; has complement 9x :
X:x 2 S. (We write F 1 X for the set of non-empty nite subsets of X.) Proof. The induction arguments are easy. For 7, we see by induction that`S :FX S = ; _ 9x : X:x 2 S. To see that S = ;^9x : X:x 2 S`S :FX false, consider I = f?; >g made into a partial order { indeed, a lattice { by ? >. The function from X to I, mapping every element to >, extends to a semilattice homomorphism f : FX ! (I; _). If S = ; then f(S) = ?, while if x 2 S then f(S) = f(fxg S) = > _ f(S) = >, so we cannot have both.
We shall now use F-induction and recursion to prove a sequence of niteness results: that if S and T are nite, then so are S T, FS and the set FT(S; T) of nite total relations from S to T. The framework of the proof is the same in each case, and can be illustrated with S T. For arbitrary types X and Y , can be treated as a function from FX FY to F(X Y ). De ning the function is not too di cult (using F-recursion, the free semilattice property and so on), but more important to us is its speci cation, that S T = f(x; y) : x 2 S^y 2 Tg { in other words, (x; y) 2 S T a`x :X;y:Y;S:FX;T:FY x 2 S^y 2 T To show that the recursive de nition works correctly, i.e. that it satis es its speci cation, one can use F-induction in a routine sort of way, but in practice this amounts to an assumption that the recursive calls work correctly and we shall make this assumption without comment. (Compare this with the method of recursion variants as set out in Morgan (1990) or Broda et al. (1994) .) Proposition 2.1.7. (Kock et al. 1975 Proof. These could be proved inductively from the construction in Proposition 2.1.7, but much simpler is to use the speci cation. For instance, for 1, (x; y) 2 S (T 1 T 2 ) , x 2 S^y 2 (T 1 T 2 ) , x 2 S^(y 2 T 1 _ y 2 T 2 ) , (x 2 S^y 2 T 1 ) _ (x 2 S^y 2 T 2 ) , (x; y) 2 S T 1 S T 2 2 is completely similar, despite the asymmetry of the underlying construction.
Proposition 2.1.9. (Kock et al. 1975 The following proposition is included not for its general importance, but because it is used later on (in Section 4.4) at a point where one might more naturally expect to use the set of functions from S to T. However, for niteness of the set of functions we should require decidability of S so that single valuedness of a relation R could be expressed as 8(x; y); (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 R:(x 6 = x 0 _ y = y 0 ). If S is nite, then we de ne a nite total relation from S to Y to be a nite relation R n S Y satisfying 8x 2 S:9y 2 Y:(x; y) 2 R. Lemma 2.1.10. If S and T are nite, then so is the set FT(S; T) of nite total relations from S to T.
Proof. If X and Y are types then we desire FT : FX FY ! FF(X Y ) such that R 2 FT(S; T) a`R :F(X Y ) R S T^8x 2 S:9y 2 T:(x; y) 2 R
We de ne FT to be the unique function such that FT(;; T) = f;g FT(fag S; T) = fR fag T 0 jR 2 FT(S; T)^T 0 2 F 1 (T )g Again, it is not hard to show that this de nition satis es the conditions for F-recursion. When S = ; we have R 2 FT(;; T) , R = ; , R ; T^8x 2 ;:9y 2 T:(x; y) 2 R as required. For the other case, R 2 FT(fag S; T) , 9R 0 ; T 0 :(R 0 2 FT(S; T)^T 0 2 F 1 (T )^R = R 0 fag T 0 ) , 9R 0 ; T 0 :(R 0 S T^8x 2 S:9y 2 T:(x; y) 2 R 0 T 0 2 F 1 (T )^R = R 0 fag T 0 ) This certainly implies that R (fag S) T and 8x 2 fag S:9y 2 T:(x; y) 2 R. For the converse, from R (fag S) T = fag T S T we deduce that there are nite R 1 and R 2 such that R = R 1 R 2 , R 1 fag T and R 2 S T. We can nd b 2 T such that (a; b) 2 R; let R 0 1 = R 1 f(a; b)g fag T. If T 0 is the direct image of R 0 1 under the projection to T then T 0 2 F 1 (T ) (inhabited because it contains b), and R 0 1 = fag T 0 . Next, R 2 in itself might not be enough for R 0 (in the case where a 2 S). However, we have 8x 2 S:9y 2 T:(x; y) 2 R and so by Theorem 2.1.6 (6) there is some R 0 2 n R such that fst (R 0 We nish this section by strengthening the principle of F-induction considerably, strengthening the induction hypothesis. (The only place where we need the stronger principle is in our account of Abramsky's normalization result for function spaces, our Lemma 4.4.5.)
Theorem 2.1.11. (The principle of strong F-induction) Let P FX be a predicate satisfying the induction step { 8x 2 S:9U : FX:(S = fxg U^P(U))`S :FX P(S) (*) Then P satis es`S :FX P(S)
Proof. Because emptiness of a nite set is decidable, the induction hypothesis (the premiss of (*)) implies S = ; _ 9x : X:9U : FX:(S = fxg U^P(U)), which is a collected form of induction hypothesis for simple F-induction. It follows that this is a formally stronger induction principle: any proof that uses the simple induction principle can easily be turned into a proof using strong induction.
The proof of validity of the strong principle is by induction on the size n of a representation S = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g (possibly with repetitions amongst the x i s { in the absence of decidable equality there is no well-de ned cardinality of S), and one role of the Theorem is to package up such induction and give a reasoning principle that does not have to refer to the representation. I am grateful to Paul Taylor for a discussion that led to a rigorous proof along these lines to replace a more complicated one that I originally had.
Let us write BX for the free commutative monoid over X. One should think of its elements as the nite bags, or multisets, over X. We write + (bag sum) and 0 (empty bag) for the monoid operation and its unit, and fj?j g for the injection of generators (so fjxj g is the singleton bag containing x). We also write # : BX ! N for the monoid homomorphism with # fjxj g = 1 (so #B is the total size of B), and : BX ! FX for the monoid homomorphism with fjxj g = fxg (so B is the set of elements of B).
It is straightforward to prove the following induction principle on BX: if P BX is such that P(0), and whenever P(B) then P(fjxj g + B), then P(B) holds for all B. We 
The 2-category Top of toposes
We shall describe here some aspects of categorical structure of the category Top of toposes (Grothendieck toposes with geometric morphisms between them) and of its slices Top=B. Though the constructions are well known, we shall need to describe them in terms of the theories classi ed { in e ect, in terms of the points of the toposes.
It is worth bearing in mind that Top is in fact a 2-category: each hom-class Top(D; E) is a category, and a large one at that (though locally small). As a consequence, it is generally too much to expect diagrams in Top to commute \on the nose", i.e up to equality { commuting is usually only up to isomorphism. In broad terms, this is because in a category equality between objects is less important that isomorphism. Moreover, universal properties should properly be described in a 2-categorical form. For instance a product D E is a representing object for a functor from Top to Cat, taking a topos F to the category Top(F; D) Top(F; E): \representing object" means that for every F the functor from Top(F; D E) to Top(F; D) Top(F; E), mapping f to (f; fst; f; snd), is an equivalence of categories.
We shall need to work not only in Top itself, but also in the slice categories Top=B.
The 2-categorical laxness that we shall allow is that the morphisms, triangles in which two sides have common target B, are to commute up to a given isomorphism. An important issue will be whether the constructions we describe are preserved by the pullback functors between slice categories: in fact, they all are.
2.2.1. Terminal object The terminal topos 1 classi es the empty theory (no vocabulary, no axioms). S1 = Set.
2.2.2. Pullbacks Let D and E be two toposes over a base B: in other words we are given geometric morphisms f : D ! B and g : E ! B. To avoid having to name too many things, we shall use restriction map notation so that (for instance) if x is a point of D then xj B = f(x).
The pullback D B E classi es triples (x; y; ) where x and y are points of D and E, and : xj B = yj B .
This construction covers pullbacks and binary products in slices Top=C. contradiction false. Then any interpretation of vocabulary will give a model for any theory, and any two interpretations will be isomorphic. The same topos ; is initial in every slice, and is preserved by pullback.
2.2.5. Bagtoposes If D is a topos, then there is also a topos B L D, its lower bagtopos, whose points are pairs (S; (x ) 2S ) where S is a set and (x ) 2S is an S-indexed family of points of D. In terms of geometric theory presentations, the slightly intricate construction involves adding a new sort (for S) and functions from the old sorts to S in such a way that the bres over elements of S are models of the old theory. This can be universally characterized as a partial product (Johnstone 1992) ; it is a notable example of a case where care is needed in giving a proper 2-categorical account of the universal property (Johnstone 1993 ). We shall not go into the details here but use these construction mainly to make geometric sense of phrases such as \set-indexed family of points". We write it this way to make it clear using bagtoposes that we have a geometric theory, but in practice we can use a more perspicuous notation. The subsingletons I and J with I + J = 1 are equivalent to a Boolean value (complemented proposition) p 9 : 2 I, and the I-and J-indexed families are equivalent to a point x of D de ned if p, and a point y of E if :p. Let 
Lifting in Top
It is convenient to summarize here general results about lifting of toposes, commonly known as scone or Freyd cover (Johnstone and Moerdijk 1989; Johnstone 1992) . Some of the coherence questions that arise are quite intricate, and we shall defer detailed discussion of them (in more general 2-categories than Top) to a later study. Here we shall be content with sketching the concrete constructions. A map between two local toposes is strict i it preserves ? (up to isomorphism). We now have a sub-2-category LTop of Top, full on 2-cells, whose objects and morphisms are the local toposes and strict maps.
We shall feel free to extend these de nitions to slice categories Top=B by change of base, getting the notions of toposes or maps being local or strict over B.
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The essence of lifting is that it provides a left adjoint to the inclusion LTop ! Top { this is exactly what lifting of domains does in a rather simpler context. It is less straightforward in our 2-categorical context, but Johnstone (1992) shows that the scone or Freyd cover construction has the right properties. In Johnstone and Moerdijk (1989) Proof. This and further properties of lifting (e.g. that it has coKZ properties) follow from the fact that L B X is a cocomma object in Top:
(The morphism up is the unit of the monad L B .)
We now turn to discuss the axiomatization by Crole and Pitts (1992) of lift. They require a xpoint-object : is an \initial lift algebra" (with structure morphism : L ! ), equipped with a global point ! : 1 ! that is an equalizer for Id and up; : ! . However, \algebra" here is used in a sense that is weaker than that of Eilenberg-Moore algebra for lift qua monad, so let us avoid confusion by using the word structure for the weaker sense.
De nition 2.3.4. Let F : C ! C be an endofunctor of a category C. Then an Fstructure is an object X of C equipped with a morphism a : FX ! X. Theorem 2.3.5. Each slice Top=B has a xpoint-object B Idl(N).
(Note that in the 2-category Top even the statement of this theorem raises coherence questions that we are neglecting for the time being.)
Proof. Let us rst prove the case when B = 1. De ne the locale to classify inhabited initial segments of N (so is the ideal completion of (N; )). is local (its initial point is f0g), and we also have a map suc : ! , suc(S) = f0g fn + 1 j n 2 Sg which, by the universal property of L, extends to : L ! . Let us note straightaway that if we de ne the global point ! : 1 ! to be the whole of N, then this is the equalizer for Id and up; = suc. For if S = suc(S) then 0 2 S and n + 1 2 S for every n 2 S, so by induction S = N. Notice that ! is a nal point of { is colocal as well as local. Now suppose F : LD ! D is a structure for L. We require an essentially unique map it(F ) : ! D that is an L-structure homomorphism, in other words ; it(F ) = Topical Categories of Domains 17 L(it(F)); F. Now an ideal S of N is a ltered colimit of the principal ideals # n such that n 2 S, so the action of it(F ) is determined by its action on principal ideals and the inclusions between them. We have {
By induction, this proves uniqueness of it(F ) on principal ideals. Let us write x n for it(F )(# n).
This proves uniqueness of it(F ) on inclusions between principal ideals, and hence (taking ltered colimits) on arbitrary points of . It also proves existence by allowing us to de ne it(F )(S) as the ltered colimit of the corresponding diagram (over n 2 S) of points of D. The argument for Top=B is similar, but parametrized by points of B. The xpoint object in Top=B is B , and this is an L B -structure by Id B : B L ! B (using the fact that L B (B ) = B L ).
We use the xpoint object to prove a remarkable property of local toposes, namely that they are exactly the topical analogues of Freyd's (1991) algebraically complete categories, i.e. those for which every endofunctor has an initial structure. By considering the identity endofunctor one can prove that every algebraically complete category has an initial object, but the converse is far from true. However, we show that if a topos D has an initial point (that is to say, it is local), then every endomap F has an initial structure { it is constructed using ltered colimits of points. To make this precise, we consider the topos F-Str] that classi es F-structures. (An F-structure is a point x of D equipped with a homomorpism : Fx ! x.) This is the inserter for F to Id D .
We rst set out some easy facts about toposes F-Str] that are familiar from the category context (Freyd 1991 Proof. 1. This is quite obvious. (The issue is that the general notion of homomorphism between models of a geometric theory has already been de ned.)
2. Also obvious. itself provides the homomorphism from Fx to x.
3. We brie y recall the usual argument. By initiality there is a unique F-structure homomorphism 0 : a ! Fa. The composite 0 ; is the unique F-structure endomorphism on a, and so is equal to the identity. Then because 0 is an F-algebra homomorphism we have ; 0 = F 0 ; F = F( 0 ; ) = F(Id a ) = Id Fa . 
H is an L S1 -structure homomorphism, so we check that two maps agree on L S1 (S 1 ) = S 1 L { they are (S 1 ); H and L S1 H; G 0 1 . Since every point of L is a ltered colimit of points ? and points n of , it su ces to check on these. For ((B; h); ?), we nd that both images in E 1 have homomorphisms ? ! b which must be equal by initiality of ? in D. For ((B; h); n), we nd that the two images are given by the following two homomorphisms to b:
To show these are isomorphic, consider the diagram:
Here, the bottom part commutes because h is an F-structure homomorphism, the middle part by de nition of a, the top right because up is a natural transformation from Id to L, and the top left because it(F 0 ) is an L-structure homomorphism.
This shows that H is an L S1 -structure homomorphism (hence the unique one) from S 1 to E 1 . But there is another H 0 , de ned by H((B; h); n) = it(G 0 )(B; n) with h tacked on, and so H = H 0 . Applying them both to ((B; h); !), we see that h = g and hence there is a unique F-structure homomorphism from A to B. 
Algebraic dcpos
The localic theory of algebraic dcpos is well-known, but we shall recall some of it here for three reasons. 1 The strongly algebraic domains that are the main concern of this paper are algebraic dcpos, and many of the points discussed here will be needed later in the special case. 2 They provide a simple example to illustrate the \Display categories" in Section 3.2. 3 We wish to illustrate the idea that a locale is a special kind of topos.
Let us rst recall the localic theory of algebraic dcpos.
De nition 2.4.1. Let X be a poset. We de ne its ideal completion Idl X to be the locale whose points are the ideals of X (the directed lower-closed subsets).
A locale is an algebraic dcpo i it is homeomorphic to Idl X for some poset X.
Certainly the theory of ideals of X is geometric; it is most conveniently presented using a unary predicate I X satisfying { I(t)^s v t`s t I(s) true`9s:I(s) I(s)^I(t)`s t 9u:(I(u)^s v u^t v u) Since the theory has no new sorts, it is essentially propositional and Idl X is a locale (more precisely, it is localic relative to the theory where X lives).
The familiar results on algebraic dcpos are constructive, and hold in a general geometric universe.
Proposition 2.4.2. Let X be a poset. Then the following frames are isomorphic: 1 Idl X 2 Frh"s (s 2 X) j "t "s (s v t) true W s2X "s "s^"t W f"u : u 2 X; s v u; t v ugi 3 The Alexandro topology Alex X on X (that is to say, the frame of upper-closed subsets of X). 4 The Scott topology on the set of ideals of X.
Proposition 2.4.3. A locale is an algebraic dcpo i its frame is the Scott topology of a set-theoretic dcpo D satisfying one of the following equivalent conditions: 1 D is order-isomorphic to the set of ideals of the poset KD of its compact elements. 2 Every element of D is a directed join of compact elements below it. Then its global points are in order-isomorphism with D.
However, neither the frame nor the set-theoretic ideal completion is geometric, so these constructions are less important to us. An important corollary from these results is that algebraic dcpos are exponentiable in the category of toposes (Lemma 4.1 of Johnstone and Joyal (1982) ). Of course, it is better known that they are exponentiable in the category of locales, i.e. locally compact. The corresponding property for toposes is slightly stronger { such locales are known as \metastably locally compact" {, but the results of Johnstone and Joyal are enough to show that it holds for algebraic dcpos.
If X and Y are posets, then by analysing the frame homomorphisms from Frh" s (s 2 X) j : : : i to Alex X one easily sees that continuous maps from Idl X to Idl Y can be described equivalently as certain relations f from X to Y { explicitly, they are those relations satisfying { s 0 w s f t w t 0`s 0 stt 0 s 0 f t 0 true`s 9t 2 Y:s f t s f t 1^s f t 2`st1t2 9t 2 Y:(s f t^t w t 1^t w t 2 ) Such relations are known as approximable mappings from X to Y . The identity approximable mapping is w, and composition is by relational composition.
Note that the last two axioms are the nullary and binary case of a more general form that can be proved from the special cases by induction on n:
We can state this more succinctly using nite sets: if T is a nite subset of Y , then 8t 0 2 T:s f t 0`9 t:(s f t^8t 0 2 T:t w t 0 )
Note also that approximable mappings are geometric in the sense that there is a geometric theory whose models are pairs (X; Y ) of posets, together with an approximable mapping (appearing as a binary predicate) between them. Let us write AM for this theory. Proof. This is an application of Lemma 4.1 in Johnstone and Joyal (1982 Top(1; D) ) that transcends the possible insu ciency of models of T in Set.
The way this works as a practical technique is that if you have an aspect of categories that can be expressed using the 2-categorical structure of Cat, then that expression can be translated to Top. For instance, a category C has an initial object i the unique functor ! : C ! 1 has a left adjoint. Transferring this property to Top gives a natural notion of \topos with initial point" (and these are the local toposes of Section 2.3). C has nite coproducts i every diagonal functor n : C ! C n has a left adjoint, and in Top we get the notion of \topos with all nite coproducts". A result of Johnstone's (1992) can then be naturally read as saying that a certain bagdomain construction freely adjoins nite coproducts to a topos.
This somewhat mystical category of generalized points is manifested as a topical category, because if T is a geometric theory then the theory of two models with a homomorphism between them is also geometric. Clearly we seek a comma The topical categories that we shall use to \topologize" categorical domain theory are actually not intrinsic categories { they are examples of the display categories that we shall introduce in the next section. However, wherever you have a topos you have an intrinsic category, and it turns out that some of those associated with the display categories for domains have particular domain-theoretic signi cance: one, for instance, corresponds to a category of domains with embedding-projection pairs for morphisms.
3.1.1. \The topos of sets is not Cartesian closed" We prove this to suggest that topical CCC's are less common than you might expect. Of course, the statement must be understood rather carefully. \The topos of sets" means the topos classifying sets, i.e. set] (usually known as the object classi er). This has an intrinsic categorical structure topically: its morphism topos is Hom set] = fn], classifying two sets and a function between them. It is this topical category that is not Cartesian closed, i.e. it cannot be extended with the (essentially algebraic, and hence topically meaningful) structure of a Cartesian closed category.
The basic idea is that if set] were a topical CCC, then exponentiation would have to be covariant in both arguments, and this is impossible.
Suppose we are given a topical CCC C, with toposes C 0 and C 1 classifying objects and morphisms, and various maps including an exponential EXP : C 2 0 ! C 0 . If we take global points, then we get classes pt C 0 and pt C 1 of objects and morphisms, with various functions making an ordinary (though large) CCC pt C. This includes pt EXP : (pt C 0 ) 2 ! pt C 0 , which is determined uniquely up to isomorphism by the category structure of pt C. Of course, with respect to the morphisms in pt C 1 , pt EXP is contravariant in the rst argument and covariant in the second. On the other hand, pt C 0 is not just a class { it is a category in its own right, and with respect to the morphisms there, pt EXP is covariant in both arguments. Now consider the case of the intrinsic topical category on set], and suppose that it is By de nition of the object classi er set], h corresponds to an object X of SD 2 , and then SD 1 is equivalent to the slice geometric universe SD 2 =X. Now for the subobject classi er, the morphism along the bottom is uniquely determined by the monic. For the etale maps, h is de ned uniquely by f only up to isomorphism, and in fact there are examples of display categories where even that uniqueness up to isomorphism doesn't hold. Hence what p classi es is really pullbacks of it equipped with speci ed pullback squares and so the notion of \classifying" is somewhat weaker that with the subobject classi er; but the comparison is still useful.
Let us call such pullbacks p-displays. If f : D 1 ! D 2 (equipped with a pullback square) is a p-display, let us call D 1 a p-topos over D 2 . Given a topos D, consider p-Top=D, the full subcategory of Top=D whose objects are p-toposes. Our interest lies in devising p to capture various notions of topos { mostly locales, actually { over (arbitrary) D as p-Top=D. We have already seen how to capture discrete spaces ( etale maps) using p : set] elt] ! set], and then p-Top=D ' SD. A second main example is that of algebraic dcpos: if we take p to be the forgetful map (forgets the ideal) from poset] ideal] to poset], then it's the ideal completion of the generic poset, and we have already argued that it classi es algebraic dcpos. (Note that there is a discordance here with the way Hyland and Pitts (1989) use the word \algebraic". For them, an algebraic topos D is one that classi es an essentially algebraic theory: its geometric universe SD is a presheaf category Set C op for some nite limit category C, and a localic algebraic topos is one for which C Topical Categories of Domains 25 is a poset { hence a meet semilattice. Our algebraic dcpos are locales D (localic toposes) for which SD is Set C op for an arbitrary poset C, and it would indeed be natural for us to de ne a topos to be algebraic if SD is Set C op for an arbitrary category.) Other kinds of locales that can be captured (sometimes in several constructively inequivalent ways) include continuous dcpos, Scott domains, strongly algebraic (SFP) domains, Stone locales, spectral locales, etc., etc. { we shall discuss some of these more fully in a later section. The main body of the paper will be concerned with strongly algebraic domains because of their computer science interest.
Let us x notation for a general scheme so far: we have a theory IS of information systems (e.g. the theory of posets), a theory IS + pt of points of information systems (e.g. We have three maps from AM 2 ] to IS] { or, more carefully, four maps with an isomorphism between the middle two. Accordingly, we get four domains over AM 2 ]. The two maps to AM] give maps over AM 2 ] between the rst two domains and between the last two, and the isomorphism gives an equivalence between the middle two. Composing gives a map between the rst and last, corresponding to a map from AM 2 ] to AM]. This is COMP, for composition.
By de nition, ID and COMP interact correctly with SRC and TAR. The unit laws and associativity follow essentially from the corresponding properties of maps, though we have somewhat glossed over the 2-categorical aspects here. We shall call the resulting topical category the display category obtained from p.
Example 3.2.1. When p is the etale classi er, then its display category is equivalent to the intrinsic category on set]. This is because maps between discrete locales are equivalent to functions (homomorphisms) between the corresponding sets.
Our main aim in this paper is to show how a speci c class of domains, namely the strongly algebraic (or SFP) domains, can be put into a topical setting to exemplify an account of categorical domain theory that in many respects works much more smoothly than the usual one. The strongly algebraic domains are chosen for exactly the usual reason, namely that the (topical) category of them is Cartesian closed and supports domain theoretic constructions including the Plotkin power domain.
3.2.1. Capturing extra structure on the display category Categories of domains are generally Cartesian ( nite products), and a few are Cartesian closed. If bottoms are not required, then the categories are generally also coCartesian. All these kinds of extra structure can be expressed using essentially algebraic ( nite limit) theories, and so are meaningful for internal categories in any category with nite limits. Unfortunately, the category of toposes is actually a 2-category, and pullback squares commute only up to isomorphism. Because of these complications we shall not here attempt to work with a proper 2-categorical de nition of \internal category" (Hyland and Moerdijk unpublished) .
Instead, when we come to investigate a particular p in Section 4 we shall show how its properties lead to p-Top=B inheriting structure from Top=B, so that constructions on p-toposes will agree with those pertaining to more general toposes. 
Examples
We can now extend the negative result of Section 3.1.1 to cover more particular sets { speci cally, nite sets and decidable sets. These give two geometric theories extending that of sets:
FinSet is presented with a constant > : FX and an axiom`x :X x 2 > DecSet is presented with a binary relation 6 = X X and axioms to make it the complement of equality:
true`x ;y:X x = y _ x 6 = y x 6 = x`x :X false These are localic over set], because they are presented without any new sorts. They are not subtoposes of set], even though non-constructively one might think of niteness or decidability as particular properties of a set X (i.e. just extra axioms). Actually, they represent extra structure on X, and this shows up in the homomorphisms. Because > or 6 = must be preserved, homomorphisms of nite or decidable sets must be, respectively, onto or 1-1.
It is normal to presume that the category Set of sets is Cartesian closed, but we have shown that the intrinsic topical category for set] is not. We might therefore ask whether perhaps DecSet] is { maybe in set] we omitted too much of the constructive structure. Then the middle square commutes, and the bottom composite edge of the overall rectangle is equal to pt EXP(h; k 0 )(f 1 ; ; g 1 ).
Proof. We prove the second part rst. Consider the exponential on functions, con- 
Strongly algebraic domains
The notion of strongly algebraic (or SFP) domain is due to Plotkin (1976) , who gave a variety of mathematical formulations. There are various avours, and for our present purposes we shall assume neither a bottom point, nor second countability (i.e. the set KD of compact points need not be countable). Recall the classical de nition: an algebraic dcpo D is a strongly algebraic domain i 1 Every nite subset S of KD has a nite, complete set MUB(S) of minimal upper bounds in KD. Here \complete" means that every upper bound of S is greater than one of those in MUB(S).
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2 Given S n KD, de ne MUB 0 (S) = S, and MUB i+1 (S) = fMUB(U) : U MUB i (S)g MUB ! (S) = i MUB i (S)
We require that MUB ! (S) (the MUB-closure of S) should be be nite for every S.
We shall describe a geometric theory whose models are \strongly algebraic information systems" { those posets satisfying the conditions for KD given above. However, there are certain issues raised by the constructive constraints. First, is the order decidable? We shall discuss this question here later (Section 4.6) in more detail, but let us say straight away that we shall not assume decidability. In fact, taking the order decidable or not gives two distinct constructive theories of strongly algebraic information systems. The undecidable version that we present here { which is the harder one when it comes to describing domain constructors { is essentially that given in Abramsky (1991) .
Second, the requirement of minimality for the bounds in MUB(S) is problematic if the order is undecidable. Classically, if S is a nite subset of a poset then we can discard the non-minimal elements to obtain a subset Min(S) comprising the minimal elements of S, but constructively this is impossible without decidability of v. If it were possible, then homomorphisms between posets { i.e. monotone functions { would have to preserve
Min. This is not so, as can be seen by considering the posets 2 = f0; 1g, with the discrete ordering, and I = f?; >g, with ? v >. There is a monotone function f : 2 ! I that maps 0 and 1 to ? and > respectively. Minf0; 1g = f0; 1g, but Minf?; >g = f?g, which is not the image of f0; 1g under f. When v is decidable, then homomorphisms must also preserve 6 v and hence are order embeddings. These do preserve Min, and indeed Min(S) can be expressed geometrically as ft 2 S j 8s 2 S:(s 6 v t _ s = t)g. We shall drop the insistence on minimality and simply require, for each nite set S, the existence of a nite set T that is a complete set of upper bounds of S (and we write CUB(S; T) to express this). Finite MUB-closures are similar: instead of describing MUB ! (S) explicitly and requiring it to be nite, we shall postulate the existence of some nite set T S such that every nite subset of T has a complete set of upper bounds contained in T.
We express this as a geometric theory as follows:
De nition 4.0.3. The theory IS of (strongly algebraic) information systems is presented (6) is a consequence of (8) and hence super uous. However, we make it explicit in order to point out that (1)-(7) axiomatize the spectral algebraic or 2/3 SFP information systems. 2 We have that CUB(S; T) , 8s 2 S:8t 2 T:s v t^8u:((8s 2 S:s v u) ! 9t 2 T:t v u) The ) direction is just a rewriting of axioms (5). For (, choose T 0 such that CUB(S; T 0 ). If t 0 2 T 0 , then 8s 2 S:s v t 0 and so 9t 2 T:t v t 0 ; we can now use (7).
3 It follows from Note 2 that the axioms for CUB make it uniquely determined by v.
Hence the map IS] ! poset] is a monomorphism of toposes, though it is not an inclusion. (If it were, i.e. if IS] were a subtopos of poset], then its structure would have to be inherited from poset] and in particular the homomorphisms of information systems would just be the monotone functions between posets. But we shall see later that preservation of CUB makes them more restricted.)
4 Classically, this new de nition is equivalent to the old one: a poset (X; v) is equivalent to the set of compact points of a strongly algebraic domain i it can be equipped with a predicate CUB making it a model for IS. For the ) direction we can de ne CUB(S; T) i T is a complete set of upper bounds of S, and for (, suppose S n X and CUB(S; T). By taking the minimal elements of T, we get a nite complete set of minimal upper bounds of S. Let U S be nite and CUB-closed. The chain (MUB i (S)) can be constructed in U, and so MUB ! (S) U is nite. 5 In practice, we don't need to describe CUB fully. For suppose X, v and CUB 0 satisfy axioms (1) -(6) in the De nition for X, v and CUB. Then we can make a unique spectral algebraic information system using X and v by de ning CUB(S; T) as the formula 8s 2 S:8t 2 T:s v t^9T 0 : FX:(CUB 0 (S; T 0 )^8t 0 2 T 0 :9t 2 T:t v t 0 ) 6 A discrete poset (i.e. a set X) can be equipped with the structure of a strongly algebraic information system i it is nite and decidable. If X is equipped with CUB, then for some nite S we have CUB(;; S), from which we see that X = S is nite; and s 6 = t i CUB(fs; tg; ;). Conversely, if X is nite decidable then CUB(S; T) i S = ; and T = X, or S = fsg = T for some s, or there are s 6 = t in S and T = ; .
7 Vickers (1998) shows that IS is equivalent to the theory of at presheaves over a category C whose objects are nite cardinals equipped with nite partial orders and whose morphisms are adjunctions (the reason for that choice of morphisms will become more apparent in the light of Proposition 4.0.6). By Diaconescu's theorem, this
shows that that S IS] is equivalent to the functor category Set C . It is also shown that this result is the geometric analogue of Plotkin's alternative characterization of strongly algebraic domains as \SFP" (Sequence of Finite Posets). Corresponding results hold for variations on IS that we discuss later, including decidable information systems (Section 4.6), and information systems with bottom, with or without termination predicate (Section 5).
De nition 4.0.4. A strongly algebraic domain is the ideal completion of a strongly algebraic information system. More precisely, there is an obvious map from IS] to poset], and the pullback along this of the algebraic dcpo classi er is the strongly algebraic classi er. We shall usually write it as p : IS] pt] ! IS]. A strongly algebraic domain (over a given topos) is a pullback of the classi er. We have already mentioned that our domains without bottom might more usually be called predomains. However, a more subtle connotation of \predomain" is \something whose lift is a domain" so that one can move between domains and predomains by adding or removing bottom. This is not possible for us. For instance, all at domains (lifted sets) are strongly algebraic, but by note (6) above the unlifted sets are not, except when nite decidable.
From the general theory of algebraic dcpos, we know that maps between strongly algebraic domains are given by approximable mappings. Hence we get a theory AM of strongly algebraic approximable mappings, i.e. those for which the source and target posets are both strongly algebraic information systems.
Besides the continuous maps between domains, it is interesting also to consider the homomorphisms between information systems, de ned in the standard way for models of a geometric theory.
De nition 4.0.5. Let X and Y be two strongly algebraic (or, indeed, spectral algebraic) information systems. A homomorphism from X to Y is a monotone function f : X ! Y that preserves CUB: CUB(S; T) ) CUB(f(S); f(T)) Proposition 4.0.6. Let X and Y be strongly algebraic (or spectral algebraic) information systems. Then there is a bijection between { | homomorphisms from X to Y | adjunctions between Idl(X) and Idl(Y ) Proof. If f : X ! Y is any monotone function, then we have an approximable mapping : X ! Y de ned by s t i f(s) w t, and f can be recovered from because f(s) is the greatest t such that s t. We can also de ne a relation from Y to X (not necessarily an approximable mapping) by t s i t w f(s). Then w; ; w = , and is right adjoint to in the sense that ; w X and ; w Y . These conditions su ce to make uniquely determined by , for t s i 8t 0 :(s t 0 ! t w t 0 ). But for an arbitrary approximable mapping , if it has such a right adjoint then f exists: for for any s 2 X we can nd t with s t s, and t is the greatest such that s t and hence unique. We take f(s) to be this t.
We have thus shown a correspondence between, on the one hand, monotone functions f : X ! Y , and, on the other, adjoint pairs ( ; ) where is an approximable mapping from X to Y and is a relation from Y to X with w; ; w = . It remains to show that is an approximable mapping i f preserves CUB. Suppose S; T n X and CUB(S; T). Then 8x 2 S:u s holds i u is an upper bound for f(S). is an approximable mapping i in all such contexts we have u t with t an upper bound for S, i.e. u t 0 with t 0 2 T, i.e. u w some element of f(T), and this is exactly what is needed to show CUB(f(S); f(T)).
Leading on from this, one can show that, using the de nitions of Johnstone (1993) , the strongly algebraic classi er is both a bration (homomorphism f gives map ) and an op bration (f gives ).
We shall now look at constructions on strongly algebraic domains { products, coproducts, function spaces and so on. (It is worth noticing that the general techniques seen in Hyland and Pitts (1989) indicate how to go beyond these domain constructions to the construction of terms for maps between domains { as also appear in Abramsky (1991) .) For each of these constructions we show how to construct a new information system out of old ones, and there are usually two issues. First, does the new one have the right points?
(Is the corresponding pullback of p the topos that we asked for in Section 3.2.1 and described in Section 2.2?) Second, is the constructed information system still strongly algebraic?
In fact, this work is largely indebted to that of Abramsky (1991) . He gave a localic account of SFP domains (with bottom) by describing a formal language for the compact opens that appear in various constructions { speci cally, products, coalesced sums, lifting, functions spaces, the Plotkin power domain, and solutions of recursive domain equations. (Our treatment di ers, in a way that has been suggested by Abramsky himself, in that we use the information systems { the posets of compact points { instead of the distributive lattices of compact opens. This generally simpli es the presentation { though perhaps not for the function spaces { but the di erence is not a deep one.)
Part of Abramsky's method relies on certain predicates on the terms that represent compact opens: binary predicates and =, and unary predicates C and T (C(a) means Topical Categories of Domains 33 that a is a coprime compact open, corresponding in our setting to a token; T(a) means that a 6 = true). Because of the presence of the recursive solutions to domain equations, the de nitions of these predicates are also recursive and so it is essential that the predicates occur positively in the de nitions. For instance, one cannot ensure merely by de nitional at that if :(a = true) then T(a), because the recursive nature means that one only gradually discovers which a's are equal to true. T must be de ned by positive means, after which it is possible to prove that T(a) , a 6 = true.
Because of this, the requirements of positivity and constructivity called for by the use of geometric logic were also called for on quite immediate computational grounds in Abramsky's work, and so essentially the work of constructivizing has already been done by him. But one can also look at this in reverse: the use of geometric logic implied by the topologization programme automatically imposes strong constructive constraints that turn out to be necessary in syntactic computation. Compare this with the lack of constraints imposed by classical logic in Vickers (1989) : the apparently simpler treatment there sometimes uses arguments that are constructively useless in Abramsky's formal system, a good example being the account of strongly algebraic function spaces. However, there is a much deeper point. The word \constructive" is often used to mean just \valid in any elementary topos", but impredicative reasoning in such constructivism can also evade the algorithmic content that Abramsky needs. It seems that it is the stronger geometric constraints that force us to consider the algorithms.
A more mundane di erence, though a signi cant one, is Abramsky's restriction to local domains (i.e. with bottom). This makes it necessary to have a di erent treatment of sums (because our coproducts are not local), and to construct amalgamated sums one requires a predicate to describe the negative information of when a token is not bottom { this appears as Abramsky's \termination" predicate T mentioned above. This issue is discussed further in Section 5. 4.0.3. Pre-information systems In De nition 4.0.3 we de ned our information systems to be partial orders. It is actually often more convenient to work with preorders. For instance, for the Plotkin powerdomain P D, the tokens can then be considered to be nite sets of tokens of D, under the Egli-Milner ordering, a preorder. However, certain technical simpli cations come from the partial ordering assumption. We shall now show that in fact we can get the best of both worlds by taking the poset re ection of a preorder. The technical point is that the axiomatization of CUB is so closely constrained by the order that it too respects the poset re ection.
De nition 4.0.7. The theory of (strongly algebraic) pre-information systems is de ned exactly as in De nition 4.0.3, but with the order allowed to be a preorder: Axiom 3c (antisymmetry) is omitted.
Proposition 4.0.8. Let (X 0 ; v; CUB 0 ) be a pre-information system, and let (X; v) be the poset re ection of (X 0 ; v) with quotient function f : X 0 ! X. De ne CUB(S; T) def 9S 0 ; T 0 : FX 0 :(S = f(S 0 )^T = f(T 0 )^CUB 0 (S 0 ; T 0 ) Then (X; v; CUB) is an information system. Proof. Straightforward. Note that if S = f(S 0 )^T = f(T 0 ), then the intuitionistic formula 8s 2 S:8t 2 T:s v t^8u:((8s 2 S:s v u) ! 9t 2 T:t v u) is equivalent to the corresponding one in X 0 for S 0 and T 0 , which is equivalent to CUB 0 (S 0 ; T 0 ).
Products
Given two information systems, X 1 and X 2 , their product is de ned as follows: the poset is X 1 X 2 with the product order, (s 1 ; s 2 ) v (t 1 ; t 2 ) i s 1 v t 1 and s 2 v t 2 .
We haven't de ned CUB yet, but already it is clear that if we can, then this is indeed the product: for an ideal I of X 1 X 2 is equivalent to a pair of ideals, one from each X i : I 1 = fx 1 j 9x 2 :(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 Ig and I 2 is similar. Of course, one should check that the argument is geometric.
Next, we show that the new information system is strongly algebraic. CUB is de ned as in note 5 after De nition 4.0.3 from CUB 0 (S; T), de ned as 9T 1 : FX 1 ; T 2 : FX 2 :(CUB(p 1 (S); T 1 )^CUB(p 2 (S); T 2 )^T = T 1 T 2 ) where p i is the ith projection. The basic reasoning is that (s 1 ; s 2 ) is an upper bound for S i each s i is an upper bound for p i (S). If M i is CUB-closed containing p i (S), then M 1 M 2 is CUB-closed containing S.
The terminal domain is the nullary analogue of this: the poset is 1 = f g, and CUB(S; T) holds i T = f g.
Coproducts
Given two information systems X 1 and X 2 , their sum is de ned as follows. The poset is the coproduct (disjoint union) X = X 1 + X 2 with the sum order: s v t i s and t are in the same component X i , and s v t in X i .
To show that this sum gives a coproduct of toposes, we must show that ideals of X are in 1-1 correspondence with points of the coproduct (see Section 2.2). If I is an ideal of X, then we have a complementary pair of propositions P 9x : X 1 :I(x) and :P 9x : X 2 :I(x). Writing I i = I \ X i , we get that I 1 or I 2 is an ideal of X 1 or X 2 according as P or :P, so if P then I 1 elseI 2 is a point of Idl(X 1 ) + Idl(X 2 ). Conversely, given if P then I 1 elseI 2 , then I = I 1 + I 2 is an ideal of X.
Noting that F(X 1 +X 2 ) = FX 1 FX 2 (the free algebra functor F : Set ! Semilattice preserves all colimits, and for semilattices Cartesian product is a biproduct), we can dene CUB((S 1 ; S 2 ); (T 1 ; T 2 )) def CUB(S 1 ; T 1 )^CUB(S 2 ; T 2 ) and if M i is CUB-closed containing S i : FX i then (M 1 ; M 2 ) is CUB-closed containing (S 1 ; S 2 ).
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The initial domain is the nullary analogue: the poset is ;, and its unique nite subset ; is CUB-closed.
Some remarks on the coalesced sum used by Abramsky (1991) can be found in Section 5.
Lifting
If X is an information system, then its lift X ? is the poset f?g + X ordered by s v t i s = ? or s v t in X.
If S : FX ? , then we can write S uniquely as S 1 + S 2 where S 1 : Ff?g and S 2 : FX. Then we de ne CUB 0 (S; T) as 9T 0 : FX:(CUB(S 2 ; T 0 )^T = f? j S 2 = ;g + ft 2 T 0 j S 2 6 = ;g) If M is CUB-closed containing S 2 , then f?g + M is CUB-closed containing S. The proof that the points are right is somewhat similar to that for coproducts. If I is an ideal of X ? , then by taking P = f 2 1 j 9x : X:I(x)g we get a P-indexed family of ideals of X, where P is a subset of 1.
Exponentials (function spaces)
Despite the expositional di erences, the mathematical substance of this section is very much based on that of Abramsky (1991) , starting from his De nition 3.4.1. We shall see how the geometric constraints automatically impose the constructivity that Abramsky required.
Let X s and X t be two information systems. We wish to de ne another information system X s ) X t ] whose points are the approximable mappings from X s to X t , and the compact points will be the approximable mappings f that are determined by a nite amount of information U n f X s X t . (In terms of the compact open topology, any U n X s X t corresponds to a basic open, the conjunction of the subbasics ff j f("x) "yg for (x; y) 2 U.) Abramsky identi ed conditions on U (our \fully summarizing") for there to be a least approximable mapping containing it.
De nition 4.4.1. We shall write p s and p t for the product projections from X s X t .
1 Suppose V; W n X s X t . We shall say that W is a summary of V i p s (W ) is a complete set of upper bounds for p s (V ) and p t (W ) is a set of upper bounds (not necessarily complete) for p t (V ).
2 U n X s X t is fully summarizing i every V n U has a summary in U. (Note that this is a geometric property of U.) 3 The preorder v on F(X s X t ) is de ned by U v U 0 def 8(u s ; u t ) 2 U:9(u 0 s ; u 0 t ) 2 U 0 :(u s w u 0 s^u 0 t w u t ) 4 The (pre-)information system X s ) X t ] has for its tokens the fully summarizing nite subsets of X s X t , ordered by v.
Let us note immediately the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4.2. Let U, U 0 n X s X t with U fully summarizing. 1 An approximable mapping f U can be de ned by x f U y i f(x; y)g v U. It is the least approximable mapping containing U. 2 U 0 v U i U 0 f U . 3 If U 0 also is fully summarizing, then U 0 v U i f U 0 f U .
Proof. The only part that presents any di culty is the \ideal" condition of approximable mappings in (1). Suppose x f U y i (1 i n), with x w x 0 i , y 0 i w y i and (x 0 i ; y 0 i ) 2 U. Let V = f(x 0 i ; y 0 i ) j 1 i ng, and let W be a summary for it in U. Then since x is an upper bound for p s (V ) we have x w x 00 for some (x 00 ; y 00 ) in W, and then x f U y 00 and y 00 is an upper bound for the y i 's.
CUB (or rather, as in note 5 after De nition 4.0.3, CUB 0 ) is de ned by what is in e ect a description in geometric logic of Abramsky's (1991) normalization algorithm for function spaces (which normalizes expressions representing compact opens of the function space). Of course, we already have an intuitionistic formulation of CUB, but we require a geometric one. Because of the positivity of the logic, that will have the avour of attaining CUB \from below", and is where the geometric constraints force us to give algorithmic content.
Let us consider a preorder < on FF(X s X t ), de ned intuitionistically by U < V i 8V 2 V:9U 2 U:U v V 8U 2 U:8f X s X t :(f an approximable mapping^U f ! 9V 2 V:U v V f)
Lemma 4.4.3. If U, V n X s ) X t ] and f S Ug < V, then V is a complete set of upper bounds for U.
Proof. If V 2 V, then S U v V and so U v V for all U in U. If W : X s ) X t ] is an upper bound for U, then S U f W and so S U v V f W for some V in V, so V v W.
Our strategy now is as follows. We de ne a geometric formula (U 1 ; U 2 ) contained in <, which is to represent a single iteration of Abramsky's algorithm (which is nondeterministic). Since < is a preorder, the re exive transitive closure (which is still geometric) is also contained in <. CUB 0 (U 0 ; U) is then de ned as (f S U 0 g; U) and Lemma 4.4.3 gives us everything we need except for existence. (In e ect, the algorithm has a loop invariant f S U 0 g < U.) We then show that for every U 0 n X s X t there is some U n X s ) X t ] such that (fU 0 g; U) and this corresponds to the termination proof of the algorithm (if executed judiciously enough). U 2 = U U 0 In other words, we have selected from U 1 an element U 0 and a subset V , found corresponding W s , W t and U for , and replaced U 0 in U 1 by the elements of U to get U 2 . It is plain that is contained in <, so is too. Note also that if (U 1 ; U 2 ) then (U 1 V; U 2 V), and so the same goes for . We can deduce that if (U i ; V i ) (1 i n), then (
Finally, we must prove termination. This is quite subtle, for the algorithm is nondeterministic and can easily go into an in nite loop by selecting unintelligent choices. Hence the proof must in e ect also show how to nd a terminating branch and how to know when to terminate. Lemma 4.4.5. Let M s and M t be nite CUB-closed subsets of X s and X t , and suppose U 0 n M s M t . Then there exists W n X s ) X t ] such that (fU 0 g; W).
Proof. Let the intuitionistic predicate P(A; B) be de ned for A n M s M t and B n F(M s M t ) as 8U n M s M t : ((U A = M s M t^B F(U)^8V n U:(V 2 B _ V has a summary in U)) ! 9W n X s ) X t ]: (fUg; W)) We shall prove that 8A; B:P(A; B), using strong F-induction (Theorem 2.1.11) on A and simple F-induction (Theorem 2.1.3) on B. E ectively, the induction on B is an induction on the number of subsets of U not yet checked to have a summary, while that on A is induction on the number of elements of M s M t not in U. These \numbers of elements" do not of course exist as genuine cardinalities (for which we would need decidable equality on the elements), but they are there as lengths of lists representing the nite sets and this is seen explicitly in Abramsky's account. We have chosen to work more abstractly, without using explicit list representations, but nonetheless you can see them in the proof of 2.1.11. For a given U 0 , the result will follow from P(M s M t ; F(U 0 )). CUB L and CUB U come out from the fact that v L and v U both make FX into a join (pre-)semilattice: the join of S and T in P L X is S T, while in P U X it is got by taking a union of sets U st such that CUB(fs; tg; U st ) (s 2 S, t 2 T). The nullary join (bottom element) in P L X is ;, and in P U X it is any S for which CUB(;; S).
Let us now concentrate on the convex powerdomain. Just as for the function space, the essential working is already in Abramsky (1991) (: Let I be the bottom ideal. It is inhabited, so it has an element x. Now I v #y for every y in X, so x v y and x is a least element of X.
Amongst the strongly algebraic information systems, the ones whose ideal completion is local form a subtopos locIS] (an open subtopos, in fact): they are characterized by the additional axiom`9s : X: CUB(;; fsg), for CUB(;; fsg) holds i s is a bottom element of X. Since we are working with posets, the bottom element is unique, and we write ?
for it as usual. (For general algebraic information systems, the local ones do not form a subtopos because the bottom has to be speci ed as extra structure.) Proposition 5.0.2. locIS] is local.
Proof. The initial local information system is the singleton f?g. For any other local information system X, the unique homomorphism maps ? to ? { uniqueness arises because a homomorphism must preserve the bottom-de ning property CUB(;; fsg). However, there is a small issue of constructivity here. Such local information systems are closed under all the constructions given except { obviously { coproducts. It is usual to substitute a di erent sum construction, either the coalesced sum (which identi es the bottoms) or the separated sum (which adjoins a new one). Abramsky uses the coalesced sum, because it is more general { the other can be de ned using it. However, in de ning CUB for the coalesced sum it turns out that one needs to know when tokens are not bottom, for one needs to say that CUB(S; ;) if S contains non-bottom elements from both summands. This information is not available in a general strongly algebraic information system with bottom, for if it were then non-bottomness would have to be preserved by homomorphisms. (For a counterexample, consider f?; >g mapping to f g.) Abramsky solves the problem by introducing a predicate T (for Termination) which would correspond in our system to an extra predicate T(s) on X with axioms to make it the complement of CUB(;; fsg). He then shows how { in our terms { all the constructions yield information systems with such a predicate. The classi er for these local information systems with termination predicate is again local, so the same techniques can be applied.
In solving D = F(D), it is a well-known fact that F ought really to have some properties of continuity. In our topical setting it hardly makes any sense for F to be other than a geometric morphism, and then the continuity is automatic { F will preserve ltered colimits, and this is the categorical analogue of Scott continuity. What's more, F does not in this setting have to be functorial with respect to continuous maps between domains, and there is no problem in using examples such as X 7 ! X ) X], which is a perfectly good geometric morphism. (It is the composite ; EXP.) It is, of course, functorial with respect to homomorphisms between information systems, and, following Proposition 4.0.6, this is an interesting route to the usual trick of using endofunctors on the category of domains and embedding-projection pairs. (We have a slight variant here { the homomorphisms are adjoint pairs rather than embedding-projection pairs. The trick still works, as was pointed out by Taylor (1986) . As mentioned in Section 4.6, the di erence corresponds to whether the order v is decidable or not.) Let us emphasize this. The domain construction F does not need to be part of a functor on the topical Topical Categories of Domains 43 category. The very act of de ning the transformation (geometrically) on objects gives us all the functoriality and continuity that we need.
Let us also describe an approach that works in the context of our non-local domains.
We The techniques just presented are in essence not so far from those already familiar from the information system approach to domains (Larsen and Winskel 1984) and followed in Abramsky (1991) . However, one obvious di erence is that we take a ltered colimit in a category of information systems rather than a directed join in a cpo (such as Abramsky's DPL1, a cpo of prelocales). Though this looks more complicated, it has a number of advantages. First, the underlying Theorem 2.3.8 is very general indeed in the way it exploits the topological nature of toposes, and it could equally well be applied in contexts such as that of quasimetric spaces in Vickers (1997a) . Second, it uses directly the category structure (homomorphisms between models) that is naturally present. To get a cpo Abramsky must restrict to the monomorphisms, and though it works in the present case it still involves a little extra e ort to show that the domain constructions are functorial with respect to them. Third, to get a real cpo requires great syntactic discipline for the order to be actual subset inclusion between the domain prelocales. This would be di cult to sustain in an elementary topos, in general lacking an intrinsic element-of relation.
Conclusions
By respecting the constructive constraints of geometric logic, we have followed Stone's dictum and topologized a signi cant portion of domain theory. The possibility of topologizing within domains (i.e. of treating the domains themselves as topological spaces or { as here { locales) is already known, though by no means the standard view. However, we have also topologized among the domains, replacing ordinary categories of domains by topical categories, and this requires Grothendieck's generalized sense of topology.
The \within" and the \among" have always been recognized as having a lot in common, as seen for instance in the similarities between two characteristic constructions of domain theory { on the one hand that of least xpoints of endomaps, and on the other that of solutions of domain equations. The wholesale topologization now presents these as two applications of our single very general Theorem 2.3.8 (the algebraic completeness of local toposes), in which generalized topological structure is seen as including ltered colimits. At the same time there is a pleasing and unexpected rational reconstruction of the way embedding-projection pairs are used in domain theory { they, or, more generally, adjunctions, arise in a completely natural way as homomorphisms of information systems.
The study therefore gives support to the topological view of domain theory by showing that it can be followed through in a cohesive way that brings out underlying connections and insights. Domain theory is not just about cpos! Nonetheless, much work still remains to be done if established results of domain theory are to be put in a topical setting. As a simple but deep example, Pitts (1996) gives an elegant domain-theoretic account of induction and coinduction, yet right from the start his treatment of relations as subsets of domains is di cult to reconcile with domains as locales.
A more obvious fear on the part of the working domain theorist is that the topological view (let alone the localic one) is more complicated: that it must already be much harder to understand a domain as a local locale than as a cpo and that the grander step of replacing ordinary categories of domains by topical categories can only be for enthusiasts. The paper has therefore also served as a case study in the geometric style of mathematics, the \topology-free spaces" of Section 1.1, showing that the topos-theoretic machinery does not need to obtrude. We have shown how some non-trivial mathematics can be done quite naturally in this framework, and that it automatically enforces constructivist constraints of the kind that Abramsky required for his formal system. Moreover, we see the constructive mathematics going beyond the syntactic systems to the semantic domains and the metatheory (which in Abramsky (1991) still contained classical features).
6.1. Arithmetic universes: some speculations Though the \topology-free spaces" are designed to make topos-theoretic work look friendly, the expositional style embodies a very radical mathematical tendency for within it the general notion of collection can no longer be adequately expressed in sets { sets are seen as particularly \discrete" kinds of collections. The full generality is expressed in locales and toposes as spaces, collections of points. This is not unprecedented, for it develops the distinction between sets and classes. We know that the collections of sets, groups, categories, and so on are \too large" to be sets and instead must be considered classes, and they are toposes too in the sense that there are toposes classifying them. Indeed, the idea of topos as described by a logical theory is a natural development of the idea of class as described by a formula of set theory. However, the distinction between sets and non-sets is now not just one of \size". Ordinarily one thinks of locales as being \small" in that both a collection of points and the frame of opens can be constructed internally as objects in the base elementary topos of sets, but in the geometric mathematics locales can no longer be internalized in this way, for both the set of points (unless the locale is discrete) and the frame of opens are non-geometric constructions. Hence not only do the large structures fall beyond the reach of sets, but so also do the non-discrete topological structures.
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What we see, then, is a mathematics in which sets are rather limited { by the geometric constraints { in what we can do with them, and their place often has to be taken by locales and toposes. For instance, if X and Y are sets then their exponential must be replaced by the localic exponential Y X { its points are still the functions from X to Y , but it is not discrete, having the point-open topology. The subobject classi er , whose elements are the subsets of 1, must be replaced by the Sierpinski locale $, whose points are the same but which has a non-discrete specialization order; and power sets PX = X must be replaced by the lower powerlocale P L X = $ X (Vickers 1997) . But why should we put up with this? What is wrong with the non-geometric constructions? In view of the beauty of the theory of elementary toposes, it seems perverse to reject Cartesian closedness of Set (notwithstanding the result of Section 3.1.1, purporting to show that the topos of sets is not Cartesian closed), powersets and subobject classi ers, and insist on replacing them with locale-theoretic substitutes.
Perhaps a clue can be found in the nature of equality. Joyal and Tierney (1984) characterize sets (in the sense of discrete locales) as those locales X for which the nite diagonals X ! X n are all open maps, so in particular equality is an open in X 2 . If we take at all seriously the idea that open means \ nitely observable", we should then expect equality to be a nitely observable relation. Informally, we nd that this property is in fact preserved by geometric constructions, but something goes wrong with exponentials { equality between functions cannot be directly evaluated, as any functional programming interpreter will quickly point out. This kind of problem with equality may serve as an early warning that the collection of functions is not as \set-like" as we might have hoped.
There remains a fundamental problem with this idea of treating toposes (Grothendieck toposes) as the prime notion of collection and treating sets as a special case. The \topology-free space" de nition of topos in Section 1.1 depended on geometric theories, the logic is in nitary, and the standard account says that the whole idea of geometric theory is parametrized by an underlying account of the objects used to index the in nities. This is given by an elementary topos as base: x your base topos and you get a theory of Grothendieck toposes (bounded geometric morphisms) over it. To make this work, the elementary topos structure of the base certainly seems necessary.
However, it seems that in the work of this paper the in nities are restricted to those that can be accessed e ectively through free algebra constructions. This emboldens us to hope that the full geometric logic is unnecessary, that it su ces to have coherent logic with assorted free algebras, and that the categories corresponding to (what we called) geometric universes could be replaced by Joyal's arithmetic universes (unpublished notes). Indeed, our choice of the phrase \geometric universe" was guided by this hope. It is still not immediate that the mathematics here would go through in arithmetic universes; on a number of occasions we use intuitionistic reasoning that would certainly not be interpretable. Nonetheless, the algorithmic avour of the constructions gives us grounds to feel that it ought to work. The theory of arithmetic universe should be a nite essentially algebraic theory and therefore self-standing.
Of course, once into arithmetic universes, we should be be completely restricted in our set-theoretic constructions, for arithmetic universes are not in general Cartesian closed and do not have subobject classi ers or powersets. It would not be possible to present frames or construct ideal completions \set-theoretically" as objects and we should be forced to use locales and toposes { their concrete manifestation would be as \classifying" arithmetic universes presented (using essential algebraicity) by generators and relations derived from the e ectively accessible geometric theories.
I should like to conclude with some speculation about constructive mathematics. Two distinct schools have come to bear on this work, the type theoretic typi ed by Martin-L of, and the topos theoretic, and these two are not always in harmony. The type theory school is tightly dependent on syntax and Abramsky acknowledges its in uence, which can be seen, for instance, in his domain prelocales. However, its interpretation of disjunction and existential quanti cation involves explicit choice that can make some of its reasoning invalid in elementary toposes. On the other hand, reasoning valid in elementary toposes can include impredicativity in a way that is objectionable to the type theorists { they need algorithms and induction. It appears that the stronger constraints of geometric constructivity (preservation under inverse image functors) do something to eliminate this, and indeed the reasoning in this paper is very algorithmic in character. It is tempting to hope that if the ideas on arithmetic universes bear fruit they could reconcile the two schools, giving predicative (or inductive) reasoning valid in toposes at the same time as choice-free reasoning for type theory.
